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I. INTRODUCTION
Nevada enacted U.C.C. Revised Article 9 on July 1, 2001.1 However,
unlike the other forty-nine states, Nevada failed to adopt U.C.C. § 9-318(a),
which was designed to prevent extensive litigation over asset securitization.2
While asset securitization has not yet been heavily litigated, the drafters of
Revised Article 9 anticipated a proliferation of litigation involving asset securi-
tization.3 Article 9 was revised to provide certainty in asset securitization and
to avoid this anticipated litigation.4 Nevada's failure to adopt all of Revised
Article 9 will continue the uncertainty regarding asset securitization. 5
Securitization is the most rapidly growing segment of United States credit
markets and is increasingly becoming a major part of foreign credit markets.6
Asset backed securities have grown from $1 billion in 1985 to $185 billion in
1999.' There are approximately $2.5 trillion asset backed securities currently
outstanding.8
Securitization allows a company that is in need of liquid assets to secure
money without obtaining a traditional financing loan.9 Securitization begins
with a company, called the originator, selling its assets'0 to a separate com-
pany, called a special purpose vehicle (SPV). I The SPV then issues securities,
* J.D. Candidate, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas (Class
of 2003). I would like to offer my thanks to Professor Bruce A. Markell and my husband,
Sean T. Waters, for all of their valuable input and advice.
' See NEV. REV. STAT. 104.9101-.9709 (2001).
2 See id.
3 Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy
Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 287, 293-94 (2001).
4 Id. at 300.
5 See discussion infra Part VIII.
6 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 947, 947 (1999).
7 Lupica, supra note 3, at 291.
8 Id.
9 Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues
and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1376-77 (1991).
11 See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text for more detail regarding the types of assets
that are commonly involved in securitizations.
"1 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 947-48.
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backed by the SPV purchased assets, to investors. 2 The SPV makes a good
investment because the SPV is specially created for such transactions and only
holds the assets, and not the debts, of the originator.' 3 Additionally, the SPV is
a good investment because when it buys the assets from the originator the
assets are removed from the originator's estate. 4 This means that, if the origi-
nator files for bankruptcy, those assets will not be included in the bankruptcy
estate.15 However, in 1993, the Tenth Circuit released a controversial decision
that, at least within the Tenth Circuit, placed such assets within the control of
the bankruptcy estate.'
6
Section 9-318(a) of Revised Article 9 was designed, in part, to avoid the
result reached in the Tenth Circuit, and to assure that SPV's could purchase
assets without risking bankruptcy by the originating company. This note ana-
lyzes the effect of Nevada's omission of § 9-318(a) on securitization transac-
tions. To accomplish this, Part II explains a typical securitization transaction.
Part III demonstrates the benefits of securitization as a financing tool, while
Part IV looks at its disadvantages. In Part V, this note examines the relation-
ship between securitization and Article 9 by analyzing the Tenth Circuit's con-
troversial decision and the efforts of Revised Article 9 to eliminate the
uncertainty created by the Tenth Circuit. Part VI looks at Nevada's failure to
adopt U.C.C. § 9-318(a), while Part VII explains why U.C.C. § 9-318(a) was
not adopted in Nevada. Finally, Part VIII explains the impact that Nevada's
failure to adopt U.C.C. § 9-318(a) may have on asset securitization.
II. A TYPICAL SECURITIZATION TRANSACTION
A typical securitization involves an originator that has a significant pool of
payment obligations.' 7 To obtain capital through the ordinary course of busi-
ness, the originator must either wait for payment on its accounts receivables or
attempt to secure a traditional loan secured by these assets.
Securitization provides an alternative means for raising capital. Investors
may be interested in investing in the company because of the company's
accounts receivables. However, investors may be deterred by the originator's
debts and the possibility of bankruptcy since the investors could lose their
money if the originator files bankruptcy. To deal with investors' insecurities an
SPV is created.18 Rather than investing directly in the originator (and risk the
originator filing for bankruptcy), the SPV buys the originator's accounts receiv-
ables in a true sale.' 9 The SPV is created with only the assets purchased from
the originator.2" Investors then buy securities in the SPV, backed by the assets
12 Id. at 948.
'3 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 950.
'6 See infra notes 85-126 and accompanying text.
'7 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 9, at 1376-77.
18 David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitizations, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1055, 1056 (1998).
'9 Id. at 1055-56.
20 Id. at 1056.
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bought from the originator.2 ' The originator is paid with the money received
from the investors,22 and the investors are paid out of the money that is col-
lected on the assets.23 The process of creating an SPV to purchase assets from
an originator and allowing investors to invest without the risk of bankruptcy is
securitization.
The key to securitization is effectuating a true sale to a bankruptcy remote
company, such as an SPV. When the transfer of assets is a true sale, the origi-
nator does not retain an interest in the assets, and the assets are not part of the
bankruptcy estate if the originator files for bankruptcy.24 Courts typically
determine whether a transfer is a true sale or the creation of a security inter-
est.2 5 In making this decision, courts weigh a variety of factors, including the
parties' intent, whether the originator retained a residual interest in the assets,
whether the purchaser paid fair market value for the assets, and whether the
originator and the SPV have recourse against one other.26 After examining
these factors, the court uses its discretion to determine whether the transaction
is a true sale or merely the creation of a security interest.
2 7
Even if a true sale is accomplished, a securitization is only effective to a
bankruptcy remote company. Bankruptcy remoteness is achieved by removing
all incentives to filing for bankruptcy.28 Different methods are used to make an
SPV bankruptcy remote. 29 For example, the activities of the SPV could be
limited to only owning the transferred assets.3 ° This means the SPV cannot
engage in any other activities and the SPV has no creditors.3" Another way in
which an SPV is made bankruptcy remote is by requiring the SPV to have the
unanimous consent of its board before filing for bankruptcy.3 2 This effectively
shields the SPV from bankruptcy since the board usually consists of the inves-
tors, and it is assumed the investors will not give their consent.3 3
21 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 948.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionaliza-
tion of Securitization, 33 CONN. L. REv. 199, 213-14 (2000).
25 Id. at 213.
26 Id. at 213-14.
27 Id.
28 Ellisa Opstbaum Habbart & Andrew G. Kerber, Getting the Right Fit, Bus. L. TODAY,
Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 33, 36.
29 Stephen H. Case & Kurt M. Hoffman, Secured Claims & Structured Financial Products




33 Id. It is not always possible to protect an SPV from bankruptcy. The unanimous consent
provision does not affect the ability of creditors to file an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition. Additionally, an originator may even collude with its creditors in an attempt to
facilitate the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition. For example, in In re Kingston
Square Ass'n, 214 B.R. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), a debtor allegedly colluded with its creditors
and convinced the creditors to file an involuntary bankruptcy against the debtor. The debtor
was precluded from filing its own bankruptcy by a clause in its bylaws requiring the debtor
to obtain unanimous consent before filing bankruptcy. Id. The Bankruptcy Court found that
the debtor nevertheless was entitled to bankruptcy relief. Id.
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When a true sale to a bankruptcy remote company is possible, investors
are drawn to investing in the SPV. In making the decision whether to invest in
the SPV, investors analyze the value of the assets. Investors do not give con-
sideration to the originator's financial condition because the originator no
longer owns the assets.34 Many times, investors rely on credit rating agencies
that rate the likelihood of repayment on the accounts. 35 The credit rating agen-
cies consider the bankruptcy remoteness of the SPV,3 6 the likelihood of collec-
tion, and the worthiness of the assets.3 7 If a rating is high, the investment is
considered to be a low risk.3 8 For securities backed by a pool of mortgages, the
credit rating agencies evaluate the "risk based on a statistical analysis of the
cash flow generated by the pool, rather than the market value of the collateral
or the issuer's own unsecured rating." 39 The rating reflects the worthiness of
the investment.
4 °
A securitization can involve many types of assets.4 ' Generally, securitiza-
tions happen in multi-million dollar deals and involve income producing assets
that are pooled together in a large, homogeneous group.4 2 The best assets for
securitization are those that have "standardized terms, delinquency and loss
experience that can support an actuarial analysis of expected losses, and uni-
form underwriting standards and servicing procedures satisfactory to rating
agencies and investors."4 3 Assets such as individual commercial real property
may be ideal for securitization.'
Generally, the originator continues to service the assets after the sale to the
SPV, meaning the originator remains in control of the assets and proceeds with
collection efforts.4 5 The originator and SPV enter into a contract providing for
servicing for which the originator receives a fee.4 6 Payments are made to the
originator without the payor realizing the account was sold to an SPV.47 Then
the originator forwards the payments to the SPV so it can pay its investors.4 8
Securitization allows the originator to transform its assets into tradable
securities. 49 Through securitization the risks of investing are reduced or reallo-
cated.5" Securitization allows the originator to obtain financing from a broader
capital market, thereby allowing for financing when traditional financing is not
possible.5"
4 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 948.
31 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 9, at 1401.
36 Habbart & Kerber, supra note 28, at 36.




41 Id. at 1377.
42 Id. at 1376-77.
43 Id. at 1377.
44Id.
45 Carlson, supra note 18, at 1091-92.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1092.
49 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 9, at 1374.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1375.
[Vol. 3:115
Fall 2002] NEVADA'S FAILURE TO SECURE ITS FUTURE 119
III. BENEFrrs OF SECURITIZATION
Many people believe that asset securitization plays an essential and benefi-
cial role in the financial market today:
52
Securitization has been a boon to virtually every participant in the capital markets,
including: banks and other financial institutions looking for alternative sources of
funds and fee income; borrowers seeking to lower their cost of funds by broadening
their access to the capital markets; investment bankers generating income by under-
writing, making markets in, and trading asset-backed securities; and investors prefer-
ring highly rated securities with greater protection from downgrading than traditional
debt and often with greater yields than securities of comparable credit quality.
5 3
Securitization also provides many benefits to originators. For example,
asset securitization benefits an originator by allowing it to liquidate its assets.5 4
A conventional loan is often not available to the originator, not because the
assets are uncertain, but because the business may not be sufficiently stable.55
By eliminating the risk of bankruptcy, asset securitization removes the stability
of the originator from the equation and allows the originator to obtain financing
based only upon its assets.56 Asset securitization also benefits the owner of
illiquid assets by allowing it to obtain multiple investors, thereby increasing the
amount of money available for a deal.57 Additionally, asset securitization ben-
efits originators because it allows an originator to receive money from the SPV
earlier than the originator would have had it kept the assets. 58 An originator
may also be paid a servicing fee for the maintenance of the assets if the assets
remain in the originator's control.5 9 Finally, securitization is beneficial to orig-
inators because it allows an originator to reduce the borrowing costs it would
incur with traditional loan financing.60
Securitization is especially beneficial for investors. With securitization,
an investor is able to engage in low-risk investing.61 When a credit rating is
52 Compare id. and Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 947 with Carlson, supra note 18, at 1055.
53 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 9, at 1372.
54 Carlson, supra note 18, at 1056.
55 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 948. However, in situations where a conventional loan would
be available, originators and investors may prefer a securitization transaction for several
reasons. First, securitization prevents the assets from being included in the bankruptcy
estate. G. Ray Warner, Asset Securitization Under Revised Art. 9, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Sept. 19, 2000, at 16. If the assets were included in the estate, the investors would have
altered rights and less certainty. Second, securitization allows an investor to invest "indi-
rectly in assets in which they could not invest directly because of legal impediments or
because the transaction seized was too large." Shenker & Colletta, supra note 9, at 1383
(citations omitted). Finally, securitization may be preferred to gaining a first priority secur-
ity interest because it allows the originator to obtain financing on more "advantageous terms
through lower interest rates or off-balance sheet structures." Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts
are Greater Than the Whole: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize
Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 139, 140 (1993) (citations omitted).
56 See generally Schwarcz, supra note 55.
57 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 9, at 1403.
58 Id. at 1395.
59 Id. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
60 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 9, at 1395.
61 Id. at 1393.
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applied to assets, the rating reflects the risk of investing in these assets.6 2 This
allows an investor to be secure in the value of the investment.63 Securitization
allows an investor to assess the value of the investment itself rather than the
qualities of the originator.64
IV. DISADVANTAGES OF SECURITIZATION
Although securitization has its proponents in the financial and legal com-
munity, others caution against its use. Since securitization has expanded
greatly in recent years, its critics warn that the negative aspects of securitization
have not yet caught up and that the disadvantages of securitization will be exac-
erbated by the rapid growth of the market.
Securitization has a major impact on third parties who are not part of the
transaction.6 5 As one commentator has argued, "[u]nfortunately, the impact of
[securitization] will be felt not merely by the parties consenting to the securi-
tization transaction, but by all the participants in the credit markets, as well as
all those affected by a securitizing firm's business."66 Generally, unsecured
creditors, like tort claimants, suppliers, trade creditors, consumers with war-
ranty claims, and employees with wage claims, suffer in bankruptcy. 67 Gener-
ally, these types of creditors do not anticipate their debtors filing for
bankruptcy so they do not, or cannot, make adjustments to accommodate for
this contingency.6 8 When the bankruptcy estate is insolvent, unsecured credi-
tors do not receive the full value of their claims. 69 This problem is aggravated
when a debtor goes into bankruptcy after a securitization.7 ° If a securitization
is effective as a true sale, the assets are not included in the bankruptcy estate,7 '
leaving even less to unsecured creditors.72 Unsecured creditors, unlike large
financiers, are not as capable of dealing with such a financial loss.7 3 These
creditors are more vulnerable to the cash flow shock a bankruptcy causes.7 4
Another problem with securitization is it will likely prevent an originator
who gets into financial trouble from reorganizing. 75 Although the originator
generally receives a lump some of money immediately after the securitization,
62 Id. at 1401.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Lupica, supra note 24, at 232-36.
66 Id. at 201.
67 Id. at 235.
68 Id. at 232-33.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 235.
71 David J. Kaufmann, Jordan Yarett, Brian L. Schorr & Curtis S. Gimson, Securitization:
An Overlooked Financing Vehicles for Franchisors, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 161, 197 (Spring
2001).
72 Lupica, supra note 24, at 235.
73 Id.
74 Id. For further discussion regarding the impact of securitization on unsecured creditors,
see G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3, 9-15 (2001).
75 Id. at 236.
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it gives up in return some of its primary assets.76 If the originator does not own
the sold assets, and the assets are not available in bankruptcy, the originator is
unlikely to have the assets necessary to effectuate reorganization.7 7 Thus, the
originator is forced to liquidate. In liquidation, the business fails, and employ-
ees, suppliers, trade creditors, and customers lose an opportunity to continue a
potentially profitable relationship with the originator.78
Although securitization has its critics, it is a practice that continues to
grow and provide a viable avenue of obtaining liquid assets.
V. ARTICLE 9 AND SECURITIZATION
Revised Article 9 is expected to bring asset securitization transactions
completely within its scope, even though securitization was partially governed
by Former Article 9.79 Former Article 9 covered "the sale of accounts and
chattel paper in addition to governing the security interests on all personal
property."8 The sale of general intangibles or instruments was not covered by
Former Article 9, but was covered by the common law of assignments.8 1
Under Former Article 9 it was assumed that a sale of assets to an SPV extin-
guished all rights the originator had in the assets, thus removing the assets from
the bankruptcy estate.82 However, in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer,8 3
the Tenth Circuit found that assets sold to an SPV were part of the bankruptcy
estate. Octagon Gas brought into doubt what was thought to be obvious: that a
seller of assets does not retain an interest in the assets sold.84
A. Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer
85
Octagon Gas "set off an international fire storm of rage and indigna-
tion.' 86 In Octagon Gas, the Tenth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, found that, even
though accounts were sold, Former Article 9 caused the accounts to be subject
to the bankruptcy estate of Poll Gas, Inc. (Poll).87
The facts in Octagon Gas are relatively simple. Poll gathered and sold gas
in Oklahoma.8 8 As part of its business, Poll owned and operated a gas gather-
ing system. 89 Amcole Energy Corporation (Amcole) owned ten percent of
Poll's stock. 90 The remaining stock was divided among four other stockhold-
76 Id.
77 Lupica, supra note 3, at 290-91.
78 Id. at 314.
71 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 949.
80 Carlson, supra note 18, at 1058.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 995 F.2d 948 (1993).
84 Carlson, supra note 18, at 1058.
85 995 F.2d 948.
86 Carlson, supra note 18, at 1059.
87 Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 948.




ers.9 In 1976, Amcole entered into an agreement with the other stockholders
to purchase their shares in Poll, whereby Amcole would becomes Poll's sole
shareholder.92 In exchange, the other stockholders received a proportionate
overriding royalty interest in the proceeds received by Amcole from gas sold
through the gas gathering system.
93
In 1982, Poll assigned to SINA 79/80 Limited (SINA) an overriding roy-
alty interest in the gross proceeds derived from the gas gathering system. 94
Rimmer, an investor, received half of its overriding royalty interest from the
1976 deal95 and the other half from the 1982 deal.96 "In 1982 and 1984, Rim-
mer purchased, from the original assignees, a portion of the 'overriding royalty
interests' created by the 1976 Agreement and the 1982 Assignment. 97 In 1987
Rimmer, Amcole, and Poll executed an Assignment of Overriding Royalty
Interest.9 8 The agreement provided that Rimmer owned a five percent perpet-
ual overriding royalty interest on all proceeds payable to Poll under the gas
gathering system.9 9
Poll paid Rimmer five percent of its proceeds from the sale of the gas until
Poll filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 1988.10 The bankruptcy trustee con-
tinued to pay Rimmer during the pendency of the bankruptcy.' 01
Under the bankruptcy plan, which was confirmed in 1990, the gas gather-
ing system was conveyed to Norwest Bank Minnesota (Norwest) in satisfaction
of its secured claim.10 2 The conveyance to Norwest was to be "free and clear
of liens, claims, interests, and encumbrances."' 0 3 Subsequently, Norwest con-
veyed the gas gathering system to Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. (Octagon)."" 4
Octagon refused to recognize any interest held by Rimmer and discontinued
Rimmer's payments. 105
A creditor of Rimmer, Bonnet Resources Corporation, brought the action,
alleging it was secured by Rimmer's interest in the gas sale proceeds.10 6 Rim-
mer successfully intervened in the action.10 7 The bankruptcy court determined
that Rimmer held a five percent interest in the proceeds that was not affected by
the bankruptcy plan.'0 8 The court held that Rimmer's interest was (1) a partial





91 Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 951.














Fall 2002] NEVADA'S FAILURE TO SECURE ITS FUTURE
right.' 9 Therefore, the bankruptcy court held that Rimmer's interest was not
property of the bankruptcy estate and was not affected by the plan and subse-
quent sale of the gas gathering system to Octagon. 1'
The Tenth Circuit held Rimmer had an interest in the gas sale proceeds,
and Article 9 was applicable to Rimmer's interest.' 1 ' This determination
placed Rimmer's interest in the bankruptcy estate, meaning he needed to have
perfected his security interest in order to have priority over Octagon's other
creditors." 2 The parties all agreed Rimmer's interest in the proceeds was an
account under U.C.C. Article 9.113 However, Rimmer argued that, even if his
interest was an account under Article 9, he owned the interest, not Poll;1 14
therefore, the interest should not have been included in the bankruptcy
estate.' 15
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the parties and held Rimmer held an inter-
est in an account, which is within the purview of Article 9.116 The court
declared, "[t]he impact of applying Article 9 to Rimmer's account is that Arti-
cle 9's treatment of accounts sold as collateral would place Rimmer's account
within the property of Poll's bankruptcy estate."'1 7 The assignment of the
account to Rimmer did not effectuate a transfer to Rimmer of all property inter-
ests in the account and did not remove the account from the reach of the bank-
ruptcy trustee." 8
The dissent stated that "[t]o apply the 'account' definition is to reverse the
completed 1976 sale and revest the interest in Poll." ' 19 The dissent would find
that Rimmer had paid several hundred thousand dollars to buy the interest and
the application of Article 9 divested him of the interest. 120 The dissent con-
cluded that the "UCC by fiat cannot change the consequences and legal nature
of a transaction contrary to the intent of the parties."' 12 1
Octagon Gas established, at least in the Tenth Circuit, that a buyer of an
account was really only obtaining a security interest in the collateral.122 The
affect of this was that an account could not be sold, making securitization of
such assets difficult or impossible.' 23
109 Id.
110 Id.
"I Id. at 952-58.
112 Id. at 955. The Tenth Circuit did not decide whether Rimmer had perfected his security
interest, but stated that the bankruptcy court must make determinations regarding Rimmer's
priority in the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 957-58.
113 Id at 954. The definition of "account" under Former Article 9 was "any right to pay-
ment for goods sold or leased, or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instru-
ment or chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106
(1999).
114 Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 954.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 954-55.
117 Id. at 955.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 960 (Seth, J., dissenting).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Warner, supra note 55, at 16.
123 Id.
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Octagon Gas was denounced in the financial press and legal journals. 124
In response to the decision, the Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. issued
a commentary stating Octagon Gas is incorrect.125 Additionally, Comment 2
to Former U.C.C. § 9-102 was amended to clarify the interpretation of the sec-
tion.' 2 6 Nevertheless, in the Tenth Circuit, Octagon Gas remained the law
until Revised Article 9 was adopted.
B. Revised Article 9 and the Death of Octagon Gas
Revised Article 9 "is intended to drive the final nail into the Octagon
coffin."' 2 7 The scope of Article 9 is expanded to bring more transactions
within its purview. 1 28 In order to completely eliminate Octagon Gas and to
support securitizations, Revised Article 9 includes several new provisions.
129
First, the definitions of Article 9 have been expanded to include a greater
number of assets and collateral.' 3 ° Former Article 9 covered the sales of
accounts and chattel paper because their financing was often accomplished by
selling the accounts at a discount, making it difficult to distinguish between
sales and financing transactions.' 3' Revised Article 9 expands the definition of
accounts 132 and chattel paper 33 to include a broader array of assets.' 34 Addi-
124 See Carlson, supra note 18, at 1059; Warner, supra note 55, at 16; Thomas E. Plank,
When a Sale of Accounts Is Not a Sale: A Critique of Octagon Gas, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 45 (1994); Note, Nikiforos Mathews, Circuit Court Erie Errors and the District
Court's Dilemma: From Roto-Lith and the Mirror Image Rule to Octagon Gas and Asset
Securitization, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 739, 740-41 (1996).
125 PEB Commentary No. 14, Transfer of Accounts or Chattel Paper (1994).
126 U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2 (1999).
127 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 952.
128 Warner, supra note 55, at 16.
129 See U.C.C. § 9-318 (2001); U.C.C. § 9-102 (2001); U.C.C. § 401 (2001).
130 Warner, supra note 55, at 16.
131 Id.
132 See supra note 113 for the definition of "account" under Former Article 9. Under
Revised Article 9,
[aiccount, except as used in 'account for,' means a right to payment of a monetary obligation,
whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, leased,
licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered, (iii) for
a policy of insurance issued or to be issued, (iv) for a secondary obligation incurred or to be to
incurred, (v) for energy provided or to be provided, (vi) for the use or hire of a vessel under a
charter or other contract, (vii) arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information
contained on or for use with the card, or (viii) as winnings in a lottery or other game of chance
operated or sponsored by a State, governmental unit of a State, or person licensed or authorized
to operate the game by a State or governmental unit of a State. The term includes health-care-
insurance receivables. The term does not include (i) rights to payment evidenced by chattel
paper, (ii) commercial tort claims, (iii) deposit accounts, (iv) rights to payment for money or
funds advanced or sold, other than rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or
information contained on or for use with the card.
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001). Under this expanded definition of accounts, more objects of
securitization are brought within the purview of Article 9. "The securitization of payment
streams that arise from the sale, lease, license, assignment or other disposal of tangible or
intangible assets . . . including credit card receivables, lottery receivables, equipment, air-
craft, public utility receivables, insurance receivables . . . all will be governed by Revised
Article 9." Lupica, supra note 3, at 287.
133 Former Article 9 stated that chattel paper:
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tionally, Revised Article 9 adds two new classes of assets to the types of sales
subject to Article 9:135 payment intangibles' 36 and promissory notes. 137 This
expansion brings most securitization transactions within the scope of Article
9.138
Second, Article 9 expanded its scope to expressly overrule Octagon Gas.
Revised Article 9 clarifies that, unlike the result achieved in Octagon Gas, a
sale of assets is possible if the parties intend the transaction to be a sale. 139
This is facilitated through multiple sections of Revised Article 9. Most sales,
such as an assignment for the purpose of collection only, are excluded from the
scope of Revised Article 9.14° However, Article 9 does not prevent "the trans-
fer of full and complete ownership of an account, chattel paper, an instrument,
or a payment intangible in a transaction of sale."'' Revised Article 9 perfec-
tion and priority rules apply to sales transactions and other transactions that
create a security interest.'
42
Finally, Article 9 was expanded to ensure that a purchaser of assets will
not suffer the fate of Octagon Gas. U.C.C. § 9-318(a) states, "A debtor that
has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note does
not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold."' 14 3 The comment
to U.C.C. § 9-318 states that this section "makes explicit what was implicit, but
means a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in
or a lease of specific goods, but a charter or other contract involving the use or hire of a vessel is
not chattel paper. When a transaction is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease
and by an instrument or a series of such instruments, the group of writings taken together consti-
tutes chattel paper.
U.C.C. § 9-105 (1)(b) (1999). Under Revised Article 9, chattel paper:
means a record or records that evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in
specific goods, a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods, a security
interest in specific goods and license of software used in the goods, a lease of specific goods, or a
lease of specific goods and license of software used in the goods. In this paragraph, 'monetary
obligation' means a monetary obligation secured by the goods or owed under a lease of the
goods and includes a monetary obligation with respect to software used in the goods. The term
does not include (i) charters or other contracts involving the use or hire of a vessel or (ii) records
that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information
contained on or for use with the card. If a transaction is evidenced by records that include an
instrument or series of instruments, the group of records taken together constitutes chattel paper.
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(1 1) (2001). Significantly, the expansion of the definition of chattel paper
has been further expanded to become media neutral and include electronic chattel paper.
Warner, supra note 55, at 16.
134 Warner, supra note 55, at 16.
135 id.
136 "'Payment intangible' means a general intangible under which the account debtor's
principal obligation is a monetary obligation." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) (2001).
137 "'Promissory note' means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary
obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgement by
a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or funds." U.C.C. § 9-
102(a)(65) (2001).
138 Warner, supra note 55, at 16.
139 See U.C.C. § 9-109 (2001).
140 U.C.C. § 9-109(d) (2001).
141 U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 5 (2001).
142 id.
143 U.C.C. § 9-318(a) (2001).
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perfectly obvious, under former Article 9: The fact that a sale of an account or
chattel paper gives rise to a 'security interest' does not imply that the seller
retains an interest in the property that has been sold.""'
The principal effect of bringing asset securitization within the scope of
Article 9 is that Article 9 perfection and priority rules will determine the prior-
ity of the SPV over creditors of the originator and a trustee in a bankruptcy
proceeding. 145 Generally, the first to file or perfect determines the priority of
conflicting interests.146 However, a sale of a payment intangible or promissory
note will perfect upon attachment. 147 The automatic perfection rules protect
securitization in payment intangibles and promissory notes from bankruptcy
attacks since the creditors will not have to take additional steps to protect their
interests.148 Nevertheless, in order to avoid arguments regarding whether there
was a "true sale," it may be best to file anyway.
149
These sections of Revised Article 9 work together to protect securitiza-
tions and to ensure consistency and predictability throughout the country.'
50
VI. NEVADA'S REVISED ARTICLE 9
Nevada adopted Revised Article 9 in its 1999 legislative session through
Senate Bill 62.151 Senate Bill 62 was introduced on January 29, 1999 on behalf
of the Nevada Bankers Association.' 5 2 As introduced, Nevada's Revised Arti-
cle 9 did not include U.C.C. § 9-318(a).' 53
Senate Bill 62 was first heard in the Judiciary Committee of the Senate. 154
Since the omission of U.C.C. § 9-318(a) was made before the bill reached the
committee and there is no mention of the omission in the committee minutes, it
appears the committee was not aware of the omission.1 55 The first hearing for
Senate Bill 62 was held on February 4, 1999.156 Alan Rabkin, from the Nevada
Bankers Association, appeared in favor of Senate Bill 62 and provided general
information regarding the differences between Former Article 9 and Revised
Article 9.157 The changes that were discussed at the hearing included the
entrance of Article 9 into the electronic age, the expansion of the definitions of
different types of collateral, and some changes to liens and foreclosures.
1 58
144 U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 1 (2001).
141 Warner, supra note 55, at 16.
146 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2001).
147 U.C.C. § 9-309 (2001).
148 Warner, supra note 55, at 17.
149 Id.
150 Lupica, supra note 3, at 300.
15' S.B. 62, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999), available at http:/www.leg.state.nv.us7oth/
Reports/history.cfm?ID=1947 (last visited October 10, 2002) [hereinafter Reports].
152 Id.
"' See id. See also NEV. REV. STAT. 104.9318 (2001).
154 Senate Bill 62: Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. Feb.
4, 1999), available at http:/www.leg.state.nv.us/7Oth/Minutes/SM-JUD-990204-Meeting%
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Scott Anderson, a representative from the Nevada Secretary of State's
office, also testified. 159 He expressed some concern regarding the implementa-
tion and filing procedures in Revised Article 9.16° Mr. Anderson requested,
and the committee agreed, that the Secretary of State should have the opportu-
nity to meet with the Nevada Bankers Association to discuss some potential
changes to the proposed bill. 161
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a second hearing on Senate Bill 62
on February 18, 1999.'62 The Nevada Bankers Association, in conjunction
with the Nevada Secretary of State's office, proposed procedural changes to
Senate Bill 62.163 At this hearing, the committee discussed changes in filing
procedures and the effective date of July 1, 2001.164 The committee approved
the proposed amendments to Senate Bill 62 and recommended a "do pass" on
Senate Bill 62.165
Senate Bill 62 was then forwarded to the Assembly Judiciary Committee,
which held a hearing on April 23, 1999.166 Testimony at this hearing stated
that, although the bill was extensive, none of the changes were radical. 167 Mr.
Rabkin and Frank Daykin, a commissioner for the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, explained to the committee the impor-
tance of having uniform laws in the U.C.C. 168 Some general discussion regard-
ing the changes Revised Article 9 would bring followed. 169 The omission of
U.C.C. § 9-318(a) was not discussed at this meeting.17 °
The final hearing on Senate Bill 62 was held on April 27, 1999.171 Prior
to this meeting, Mr. Rabkin provided the committee with a summary of the
differences between Revised Article 9 and Former Article 9.172 After little





162 Senate Bill 62: Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. Feb.
18, 1999), available at http:/www.leg.state.nv.us/70th/Minutes/SM-JUD-990218-SB%2062,




166 See Senate Bill 62: Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 leg., 70th Sess.
(Nev. Apr. 23, 1999), available at http:/www.leg.state.nv.us/70th/Minutes/AM-JUD-






171 Senate Bill 62: Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 leg., 70th Sess. (Nev.
Apr. 27, 1999), available at http:/www.leg.state.nv.us/7oth/Minutes/AM-JUD-990427-





Senate Bill 62 passed in both houses.174 The Senate voted on the bill on
March 3, 1999, and it passed seventeen to one.' 5 The Assembly voted on the
bill on April 29, 1999, and it passed thirty-nine to zero. 1 76 Governor Guinn of
Nevada signed the bill into law on May 11, 1999.177
VII. AN EXPLANATION FOR THE OMISSION OF U.C.C. § 9-318(a)
FROM NEVADA'S REVISED ARTICLE 9
Nevada is the only state that did not adopt U.C.C. § 9-318(a).' 7 8 The
omission of U.C.C. § 9-318(a) was not discussed in the committee hearings, 179
and there does not appear to be a clear explanation as to why Nevada failed to
adopt this one section of Revised Article 9.
However, there are some possible explanations as to why U.C.C. § 9-
318(a) was not included in the Revised Article 9 presented to the Nevada State
Legislature. Possibly, the omission of U.C.C. § 9-318(a) was inadvertent.
However, the omission could have been deliberate and in reaction to the con-
troversial nature of U.C.C. § 9-318(a).
The Nevada Bankers Association introduced Senate Bill 62 without
U.C.C. § 9-318(a) included. It is possible that no one realized U.C.C. § 9-
318(a) was omitted from the bill introduced to the Nevada State Legislature.




178 See ALA. CODE § 7-9A-318(a) (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 45.29.318(a) (Michie 2001);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 47-9318(a) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-318(a) (Michie 2001); CAL.
COM. CODE § 9318(a) (West 2001); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 4-9-318(a) (2001); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 42a-9-318(a) (2001); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 9-318 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28:9-318(a) (2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 679.3181(1) (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-318(a)
(2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:9-318(a) (2001); IDAHO CODE § 28-9-318(a) (Michie 2001);
810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-318(a) (2001); IND. CODE § 26-1-9.1-318(a) (2001); IOWA CODE
§ 554.9318(1) (2001); 2000 Kan. Sess. Laws 142; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-318(1)
(Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-318(a) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 9-1318(1) (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 9-318(a) (2001); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 106, § 9-318(a) (2001); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 440.9318(1) (2001); MINN. STAT.
§ 336.9-318(a) (2001); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-9-318(a) (2001); Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-
318(a) (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9A-318(1) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-318(a)
(2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:9-318(a) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-318(a)
(2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §55-9-318(a) (Michie 2001); N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-318(a) (McKinney
2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-318(a) (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-38 (2001); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.318(A) (West 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §1-9-318(a)
(West 2001); 2001 Or. Laws 445; 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9318(a) (West 2001); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 6A-9-318(a) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-318(a) (Law. Co-op 2001); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-318(a) (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-318(a) (2001);
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.318(a) (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9a-
318(1) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 9-318(a) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-318(a)
(Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9A-318(a) (West 2001); 2000 W. Va. Acts
272; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 409.318(1) (West 2001); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-9-318(a) (Michie
2001).
179 See Feb. 4 Hearing, supra note 154; Feb. 18 Hearing, supra note 162; Apr. 23 Hearing,
supra note 166; Apr. 27 Hearing, supra note 171.
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Considering how large Revised Article 9 is,' 8 ° there is the potential the omis-
sion was inadvertent. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that the absence of
U.C.C. § 9-318(a) was deliberate.
There are several possible explanations as to why the Nevada Bankers
Association would omit U.C.C. § 9-318(a); nonetheless, it is difficult to deter-
mine the specific reason why they would do so. Banks are in a unique situation
with securitization because they are the one entity that is directly and unavoid-
ably affected, in both negative and positive ways, by securitization.' 8 ' Com-
mercial banks find securitization attractive because it allows them to reduce
their required capital holdings while at the same time earning income from
origination and service fees.' 82 Securitization also provides a bank greater
liquidity, "not just in terms of the marketability of assets and liabilities, but also
by encouraging a plethora of substitute or alternative investment and borrowing
opportunities." '183 However, when securitization is made easier, banks are
forced to either participate or lose a significant amount of business to securities
firms . 84 Securitization may also make it more difficult for banks because
securities firms are not governed by the same stringent regulations as banks. 185
Another possible explanation for the omission of U.C.C. § 9-318(a) is that
it creates a conflict between Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code. 186 U.C.C. § 9-
318(a) allows for the removal of certain assets from a bankruptcy estate. Since
the bankruptcy trustees seek to include as many assets in the bankruptcy estate
as possible, 187 while U.C.C. § 9-318(a) allows the avoidance of assets being
placed in the bankruptcy estate, a clear conflict is created between Revised
Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code. 188 Additionally, creditors of the originator
are uniquely disadvantaged when the originator securitizes its assets.189 Omit-
ting U.C.C. § 9-318(a) relieves some of this competition and loss.' 90
Regardless of why U.C.C. § 9-318(a) was omitted, the impact of its omis-
sion will be felt in the business world.
180 "[Revised Article 9] contains 80 definitions, 126 provisions and is 298 pages long. Its
predecessor, puny by comparison, has 14 definitions, 57 provisions and spans a mere 129
pages." Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, 2001: A Code Odyssey (New
Dawn For the Article 9 Secured Creditor), 106 COMMERCIAL. L.J. 105, 105 (2001).
181 See generally Stephen J. Cosentino, Note, Swimming in New Waters - Bank Participa-
tion in Securitized Loan Pools, 65 UMKC L. REV. 543, 546-50 (1997).
182 Id. at 546.
183 id.at 547.
'84 Id. at 546.
185 Id. at 551-59.
186 Warner, supra note 74.
187 Carlson, supra note 18, at 1060.
188 However, the Bankruptcy Code is currently being revised. "The pending bankruptcy
legislation contains language that would exclude assets transferred to an entity in a securi-
tization from the estate." Patrick J. Murphy, Revised Article 9 in Bankruptcy Cases, 826
PLI/CoMM 331, 336 (2001). This change would eliminate the inconsistencies between the
bankruptcy code and Revised Article 9 regarding securitizations.
189 See supra Part IV.
190 See Carlson, supra note 18; Warner, supra note 55; Murphy, supra note 188, for further
discussion regarding this competition.
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VIII. THE IMPACT OF NEVADA'S FAILURE TO ADOPT U.C.C. § 9-318(a)
Nevada's failure to adopt U.C.C. § 9-318(a) significantly impacts
Nevada's attempt to encourage businesses to conduct business in Nevada. For
the past several years, Nevada has made a concerted effort to be a pro-business
state. For example, Nevada attempted to become business friendly through the
creation of business courts in 1999.191 The business courts enable business
disputes to be resolved in front of specialized judges on a shorter time frame
than would be experienced in the District Courts of Nevada.' 92
Another example of Nevada's pro-business efforts is the passage of Senate
Bill 61 in 1999,19' which allows for the creation of business trusts.'9 4 Business
trusts are increasingly used for asset securitization.1 95 A business trust can be
organized as bankruptcy and liability remote by placing appropriate safeguards
in the certificate of trust. 19 6 Additionally, the trustee can be a representative of
the investors who are purchasing the SPV securities.197 As one commentator
notes:
The Nevada business trust, with its great flexibility and with statutory provisions
allowing its trustees to be protected from fiduciary duty suits, is an advantageous
vehicle for structured financings. This flexible and protective vehicle, along with the
minimal taxation imposed by Nevada on assets situated in this state, provide an ideal
place and an ideal entity for structured financings in the future.
198
Senate Bill 61 was considered by the Senate Committee of Judiciary, the
same committee that heard Senate Bill 62 (Revised Article 9). The testimony
on Senate Bill 61 stressed the economic importance of business trusts in bring-
ing more business to Nevada.1 99 U.C.C. § 9-318(a) would have worked in con-
junction with Senate Bill 62 to facilitate asset securitization. However, this
result is not possible, given that U.C.C. § 9-318(a) was omitted from Nevada's
Revised Article 9.
The passage of Senate Bill 61, without the adoption of U.C.C. § 9-318(a),
leaves the future of asset securitization uncertain. A successful asset securitiza-
tion requires a true sale to a bankruptcy remote company. Laws facilitating the
formation of business trusts help the formation of bankruptcy remote SPV's.
The failure to allow a true sale to take place leaves uncertainty in the securitiza-
tion process. U.C.C. § 9-318(a) would have allowed a true sale to take place
and prevent the assets from being placed in the bankruptcy estate.
191 Robert L. Crowell, Whassup in the 2001 Legislature, NEV. LAWYER, Jan. 2001, at 16,
17.
192 Id.
193 Codified at NEV. REV. STAT. 88A.010-.930 (2001).





198 Id. at 17.
199 Senate Bill 61: Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. Feb.
3. 1999), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.usi70th/Minutes/SM-JUD-990203-Meeting
%202.html (last visited October 10, 2002).
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However, since Nevada failed to adopt U.C.C. § 9-318(a), businesses will
be discouraged from doing business in Nevada because Revised Article 9 states
perfection and priority are governed by the laws of the state of organization. 200
Thus, any business that is organized in Nevada will be in a state of uncertainty
regarding securitization. When a business cannot be assured its transfer of
assets will be treated as a true sale, it may avoid organization under Nevada
law, which could cause Nevada to suffer a significant financial loss.
The uncertainty of the success of securitizations in Nevada will not only
deter businesses from engaging in transactions here, but will also result in large
financial costs to those who take the risk. Rating agencies, which primarily
consider whether assets can be protected from the debts of the originator
through a true sale, will not value assets in Nevada as high as in other states.
This will encourage people to seek investments elsewhere.
The inability of rating agencies to give Nevada assets high ratings also
affects those who choose to invest in Nevada. Investors who invest in an SPV
in Nevada can either suffer a huge financial loss or a huge windfall on their
investment. In Octagon Gas, Rimmer lost hundreds of thousands of dollars
through the investment.2 °1 However, a huge windfall could also be recognized
due to undervaluation. When the risk of investment is high, and the assets are
undervalued, the investors may get higher returns on anything that is paid,
resulting in a loss to the originator.
Those who decide to engage in securitizations in Nevada will likely expe-
rience large litigation costs as a result of the fact that Nevada law is unclear on
whether assets sold to an SPV are part of the bankruptcy estate. If an originator
files for bankruptcy and has assets securitized in Nevada, the parties will have
to litigate to determine whether the assets should be placed in the bankruptcy
estate. This will result in significant costs to both litigants and Nevada.
Nevada courts, in deciding whether assets sold in a securitization are part
of the bankruptcy estate, will have several choices of how to treat the omission
of U.C.C. § 9-318(a). Courts in the United States have interpreted a state's
failure to enact part of a uniform law in many different ways.
Some courts have declared that legislative intent is expressed by what the
legislature does say, not by what they could have or might have said.2 02 For
example, in In re Chaseley's Foods, Inc.,2°3 the Seventh Circuit declared the
Bankruptcy Court erred when it stated that Indiana's failure to adopt an amend-
ment to the U.C.C. in 1972 shed light on the meaning of the effective statute.2°
The Seventh Circuit said that only the language adopted by the legislature may
aid in the interpretation of the meaning of the statute.20 5
200 U.C.C. § 9-301 (2001); U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (2001).
201 See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 960 (Seth, J., dissenting).
202 See Iowa v. Beach, 630 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 2001); Washington v. Moses, 37 P.3d
1216 (Wash. 2002).
203 726 F.2d 303 (1984).
204 Id. (The 1962 version of the U.C.C was effective in Indiana at the time.).
205 Id.
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On the other hand, other courts have held that language specifically
removed or rejected must be considered.2 ° 6 In Transportation Insurance Co. v.
El Chico Restaurant, Inc. ,207 the court determined that when the Georgia Leg-
islature revised Georgia's business laws and adopted the Georgia Business Cor-
poration Code, the deletion of unwanted language from the former law must be
given meaning.2°8 "We must presume that the Legislature's failure to include
the limiting language was a matter of considered choice. °2 0 9 This same pro-
position also found support in Husted v. Auto-Owner's Insurance Co.,2 10 where
the Supreme Court of Michigan stated the courts of Michigan "have repeatedly
held that the Legislature's failure to adopt language contained in the uniform
act creates a presumption that the corresponding language was considered and
rejected." 2 1 '
Nevada's situation is similar to, but not the same as, that of the preceding
states. First, Nevada's situation is unique from the situation seen in Chaseley's
Foods because Nevada does not have another law in effect to govern securitiza-
tions. This means the courts will have little direction in deciding whether
assets involved in securitizations should be included in a bankruptcy estate. As
a result, the issue is not that Nevada lacks a specific law, but rather that Nevada
does not have a section of a uniform law that every other state has adopted.
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the absence of this law is irrelevant.
Nevertheless, if the court assumes the omission was unintentional, it would
have to find another way to decide this issue. Second, Nevada's situation may
be distinguished from that of Husted and El Chico Restaurant in that the
Nevada Legislature never considered or specifically rejected U.C.C. § 9-
318(a). The Legislature did not appear to be aware of the omission of this
section from the proposed Revised Article 9. It is unknown if the Legislature
would have accepted U.C.C. § 9-318(a) if it had been included in Senate Bill
62. If the courts decide the omission of U.C.C. § 9-318(a) indicates legislative
intent to adopt the opposing view, the result of Octagon Gas is certain in
Nevada. Due to Nevada's unique situation, these methods of interpretation will
not prove to be useful.
Some courts have determined that when a state fails to adopt part of a
uniform law, it is attempting to retain prior law.2 1 2 Since Nevada has never
decided whether assets sold in a securitization should be included in the bank-
ruptcy estate of the originator, the court will have to resort to the law of other
states under Former Article 9, which could lead to two different results. First,
the courts could maintain "what was implicit, but perfectly obvious, under for-
206 See In re Jones, 192 B.R. 289, 292 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1996); VJC Prod., Inc. v. Kydes,
903 F.Supp. 42, 44 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Wiebenga v. Iowa Dept. of Trans., 530 N.W.2d 732,
735 (Iowa 1995); Leary v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 657 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Mass. 1995);
Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 528 (Wyo. 1995); Million v. Indiana, 646 N.E.2d 998, 1002
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Johansen v. Johansen, 45 P.3d 520, 523 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
207 524 S.E.2d 486 (Ga. 1999).
208 Id. at 488.
209 Id.
210 591 N.W.2d 642, 645 (Mich. 1999).
211 Id. at 645.
212 See North Amer. Co. v. Koemer, 211 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. 1948).
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mer Article 9:''213 when assets are sold, they are no longer subject to the bank-
ruptcy estate. This was the majority view in the United States and was codified
in U.C.C. § 9-318(a). If the court takes this approach, then, even though
Nevada did not adopt U.C.C.§ 9-318(a), the result would be the same as if
Nevada had adopted this section. Second, the courts could adopt the opinion of
the Tenth Circuit, as reflected in Octagon Gas. If the court finds the reasoning
of the Tenth Circuit persuasive, the assets sold would be included in the bank-
ruptcy estate and securitization would not be possible in Nevada.
Another option the court could resort to is common law, an option often
pursued where there is a lack of statutory law.2 14 Such an approach would
return the same results as if Former Article 9 law were still in effect. 2 15 How-
ever, it is possible the courts would find there is other statutory law governing
securitization outside of Article 9. For example, the Bankruptcy Code may
govern whether assets sold in a securitization are part of the bankruptcy
estate.216 The court could also look to other sections of Article 9 to determine
whether the assets should be part of the bankruptcy estate.2 1 7 With the expan-
sion of Revised Article 9, a court could find that, even though U.C.C. § 9-
318(a) was not adopted, other sections of Revised Article 9 cover
securitization.
The omission of U.C.C. § 9-318(a) from Nevada's Revised Article 9 cre-
ates much confusion. Investors will be unable to trust investments in Nevada
businesses because it is impossible to determine how the courts will treat the
exclusion of U.C.C. § 9-318(a) from Nevada's Revised Article 9.2 8 There-
fore, businesses face the task of finding ways to obtain liquid assets without
resort to securitization.
IX. CONCLUSION
The U.C.C. is designed to establish uniformity in all of the states.219 "As
is customary for uniform laws, this Article is based on the general assumption
that all States will have enacted substantially identical versions. While always
important, uniformity is essential to the success of this Article."22 The impor-
tance of uniformity in the U.C.C. was recognized during the Nevada State Leg-
islature's hearings on Senate Bill 62, where several references were made to the
importance of adopting Revised Article 9 along with the other forty-nine
states.22' When Nevada failed to adopt part of Revised Article 9, especially a
section that works in conjunction with other sections and is important to trans-
213 U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt 2 (2001).
214 NEV. REV. STAT. 1.030 (2001).
215 See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
217 See discussion supra Part V.B.
218 To add more confusion, the Nevada courts could ignore the legislative history and Octa-
gon Gas, and interpret its version of Article 9 as if U.C.C. § 9-318(a) was adopted in its
intended form.
219 U.C.C. § 9-701, cmt. (2001).
220 Id.
221 See Feb. 4 Hearing, supra note 154; Feb. 18 Hearing, supra note 162; Apr. 23 Hearing,
supra note 166; Apr. 27 Hearing, supra note 171.
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actions, uncertainty is cast into an area of legislation that aspires to uniformity
and predictability across all of the states.
Nevada's failure to adopt U.C.C. § 9-318(a) will have a significant impact
on businesses in the state of Nevada and will likely deter investors from
Nevada businesses. Instead of adopting a uniform law, the Nevada Legislature
adopted a non-uniform U.C.C. Unfortunately, Nevada's action has a further
reaching impact than simply not adopting a law. Since the U.C.C. is to be
uniform throughout all of the states, the fact that one state did not adopt a
section means that Nevada may now be adopting a view directly contrary to the
other states. This is propagating the Octagon Gas decision, a decision greatly
contested and deplored by the financial and legal communities. The Nevada
Legislature should act quickly to bring its U.C.C. into conformity with the rest
of the United States and avoid the problems of Octagon Gas.2 22
222 U.C.C. § 9-318(a) is rumored to be adopted by Nevada as a technical correction in its
next legislative session, scheduled to begin in January of 2003. However, even if U.C.C.
§ 9-318(a) is adopted, the uncertainty created by its omission will continue in the interpreta-
tion of asset securitization conducted during the time the section was missing.
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